Category: articles

Patrick Ducharme

One of the pre-requisites to admissibility of evidence under this exception is that the acts or declarations are performed in furtherance of the conspiracy or agreement. Chang referred to the “in furtherance requirement” as imbuing “co-conspirators’ declarations with res gestae type qualities.” It referred to “in furtherance declarations” as “the very acts by which the conspiracy is formulated or implemented and are made in the course of the commission of the offence.”1 They are part of the res gestae in the execution of the plan of the agreement.
Continue reading ““In Furtherance” Requirement”

Patrick Ducharme

The Court of Appeal for Ontario was required to consider a two-person conspiracy to traffic in cocaine in the case of Bogiatzis.1 This case highlights the unique difficulties that may occur when the court is dealing with just a two-person conspiracy. For example, if the prosecution’s case is dependent upon a series of meetings between two Crown witnesses, and, the accused was present for two of their meetings.
Continue reading “When Conspiracy Involves Only Two Persons”

Patrick J Ducharme

Sir Walter Raleigh was tried for treason in 1603. The key prosecution evidence was a sworn confession by Lord Cobham, Raleigh’s alleged co-conspirator. Raleigh testified. He called Cobham’s confession a lie and insisted that Cobham had recanted his confession. He protested the admission of this hearsay. He demanded that Cobham be brought to testify. The court refused and Raleigh was convicted and later executed.
The public outcry against this unproven evidence fuelled the introduction of the hearsay rule instituted in England somewhere between 1675 and 1690.1 Ironically, a conspiracy trial inspired the hearsay rule. I say ironically because our modern day use of the co-conspirators’ exception to the hearsay rule renders the protections afforded by the hearsay rule virtually meaningless, particularly when the case is one tried before a jury.
Continue reading “A Little History”

Patrick Ducharme

The Supreme Court of Canada in Carter1 provided the method by which evidence would be admissible under the co-conspirators’ exception and McIntyre J. five years later succinctly summarized the procedure under Carter as a three-step process:

i. The trier of fact must first be satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the alleged conspiracy in fact existed;

ii. If the alleged conspiracy is found to exist, then the trier of fact must review all the evidence that is directly admissible against the accused and decide, on a balance of probabilities, whether or not he is a member of the conspiracy;

iii. If the trier of fact concludes, on a balance of probabilities, that the accused is a member of the conspiracy, then the trier of fact must go on and decide whether the Crown has established such membership beyond a reasonable doubt. In this last step only, the trier of fact can apply the hearsay exception and consider evidence of acts and declarations of co-conspirators, done in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, as evidence against the accused on the issue of his guilt.
Continue reading “The Supreme Court of Canada on the Co-Conspirator Exception to the Hearsay Rule”

Patrick Ducharme

The hearsay rule has a necessary and essential purpose. It requires witnesses to testify in court if their words are to be considered for their truth. Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible. The rule against hearsay evidence values cross-examination of witnesses to test or challenge their credibility and reliability. Admissible hearsay is thus the exception.
Continue reading “Hearsay and the Co-Conspirators’ Exception to Hearsay”

Patrick J Ducharme

It is not the rule that offends one’s senses; it is the application of the rule. Judges routinely claim to be able to hear prejudicial evidence in the course of making a legal ruling on evidence, then banish from their minds the prejudicial aspects of that evidence if a ruling is made in favour of the accused thus excluding the evidence. Of this claim I am depressingly suspicious. My suspicion soars, however, at the thought of jurors attempting to accomplish this same segregation of thought.
Continue reading “Application of the Rule”

Patrick Ducharme

Rationale for the Rule

The Rule is based upon principles of agency. Each member of a common unlawful scheme impliedly permits every other member of the unlawful scheme the right to act or speak on her behalf in pursuit of the common unlawful plan.

The above is the an excerpt of Patrick J Ducharme's book, Canadian Criminal Procedure Volume 2, available at Amazon or in bulk through MedicaLegal Publishing along with Criminal Trial Strategies.

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Patrick Ducharme

The Co-Conspirators’ Exception to the Hearsay Rule

The Rule

The co-conspirators’ exception to the hearsay rule permits the acts, declarations, statements or utterances of an accused’s alleged co-conspirators, performed or made in furtherance of a conspiracy, to be presented as evidence against the accused as proof of his or her guilt. Declarations and acts are treated equally.

The above is the an excerpt of Patrick J Ducharme's book, Canadian Criminal Procedure Volume 2, available at Amazon or in bulk through MedicaLegal Publishing along with Criminal Trial Strategies.

Subscribe to Patrick Ducharme's Youtube Channel

Patrick J Ducharme

In some cases a trial Judge will allow jurors to take notes during the testimony. The trial Judge will usually allow jurors to take notes provided the trial Judge is convinced that note taking will not interfere with juror’s ability to listen to and consider all of the evidence. Some trial Judges will also allow, in limited circumstances, jurors to ask questions during the course of the trial. This is, however, an exception to the general rule. Generally, jurors sit and listen quietly and patiently until all the evidence has been heard, closing submissions have been made and they have been instructed by the trial Judge’s “charge” to them as to the law and evidence.
Continue reading “Note-Taking by Jurors”

Patrick Ducharme

There are now two parts to the issue of reliabilty; threshold reliability and ultimate reliability. In determining the question of threshold reliability, the trial Judge acts as a gatekeeper, mindful that hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible. The ultimate reliability is left to the trier of fact. To determine threshold reliability all relevant factors need to be considered, including, for example, the presence of supporting or contradictory evidence. Here, the court expressly overruled its earlier decision in Starr.1
Continue reading “There Two Parts to the Issue of Reliabilty”